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asserted against him. To sustain federal question jurisdiction over a
declaratory judgment action, the courts normally look for a claim
arising from a federal statute or the Constitution which could be
coercively asserted by defendant.". It is even more reasonable for the
court to determine the amount in controversy from the coercive claim
which could be asserted by defendant, 8 i.e., in the instant case, de-
fendant's claim for $14,035, liability from which plaintiff seeks to be
free.
It is believed, then, that in determining the rule of law estab-
lished by this case the facts that: (1) under state procedure it was
a de novo action; and (2) that the position of the parties and the
issues involved are the same as in a declaratory judgment action,
indicate that jurisdictional amount was not established by counter-
claim.
H. Jefferson Herbert, Jr.
TORTS-LAsT CLEAR CnNcE-L-r Tuer Doar.iN -Action for in-
juries sustained by plaintiff when her automobile was struck by de-
fendant's oncoming vehicle as plaintiff was negotiating a left turn at
an intersection. The two automobiles involved were proceeding in
opposite directions on the same street. Plaintiff's car stopped for a
traffic light at an intersection. When it changed to green plaintiff
proceeded to turn left and into the path of defendant's car which
was proceeding through the intersection. The two cars collided within
the intersection. The jury found both parties negligent and denied
recovery. Plaintiff appealed contending the court erred in refusing
to give instructions regarding last clear chance and the defendant's
duty to yield the right-of-way. Held: Affirmed. To merit an instruc-
tion on last clear chance the burden was upon plaintiff to prove that
the collision was caused by defendant's negligent act or failure to
act after plaintiff placed herself in a position of peril. Plaintiff failed
to sustain this burden of prooL An instruction was denied that it
was the duty of defendant to yield the right-of-way if plaintiff en-
1 7 See Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 242 (1952); Skelly
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
18 For federal question jurisdiction a claim must arise under the Consti-
tution, laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §1331 (1958). This
language restricts the jurisdictional determination to plaintiff's complaint more
than 28 U.S.C. §1332(a) (1958), which requires that "the matter in contro-
versy [exceed] . . .the sum or value of $10,000 ... " If, in a declaratory judg-
ment action, the court will look for a federal question which could be asserted
coercively by defendant, a fortiori the court may determine the amount in con-
troversy from such prospective coercive action.
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tered the intersection reasonably well ahead of the defendant. Re-
lying upon Walton v. Grant,' and Elliott v. Drury's Adm'x, 2 the in-
struction should have been given. However, this court has changed
its position by holding that priority shall be given to the vehicle
proceeding in a straight course. The above-mentioned cases were
overruled, therefore, failure to instruct as requested was not error.
Rankin v. Green, 346 S.W.2d 477 (Ky. 1961).
The court reiterated its disapproval of the last clear chance doc-
trine but once again left its applicability subject to several interpre-
tations. In addition, the court created the concept of absolute liability
for a driver making a left turn who collides with an oncoming vehicle.
Did the court really intend to establish as standards the burdens it
appears to have placed upon the plaintiff in this case? The two
aspects of the case, last clear chance and the left turn doctrine, will
be discussed separately.
Last Clear Chance
The doctrine of last clear chance is a modification of the strict
rules of contributory negligence. Emphasis is placed upon the time
sequence of events, and the defendant will be held liable if immedi-
ately prior to the harm, he had a last clear chance to avoid the acci-
dent. The doctrine has been recognized, to some extent, in most
jurisdictions; however, there is a considerable variance in the factual
situations to which it is applied. The most troublesome problem
presented is the test for its application: in order to have the last
clear chance to avoid the accident is it necessary that the defendant
did see plaintiff's peril, or is it necessary only that the defendant
should have seen plaintiff's peril.4
This problem has given the Kentucky court difficulties. To justify
submission of the doctrine to the jury the plaintiff must sustain the
burden of establishing, as a matter of law, enough facts to show that
the defendant had a last clear chance to avoid the accident.5 Must
plaintiff prove that the defendant did see his perilous position or only
that he should have seen it?
Previously the doctrine, in Kentucky automobile cases, has been
1302 Ky. 194, 194 S.W.2d 866 (1946).2304 Ky. 93, 200 S.W.2d 141 (1947).
8 Saddler v. Parham, 249 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Ky. 1952):
While it might be desirable that a tightening of the doctrine of last
clear chance be accompanied by a relaxation of the rules governing
contributory negligence, it is difficult to see how the latter can be ac-
complished, short of the adoption of a comparative negligence statute.
4 See, 2 Harper & James, Torts §2213 (1956); Prosser, Torts §52 (1955).5 Johnson v. Morris Adm'x, 282 S.W.2d 835 (Ky. 1955);' Saddler v. Par-
ham, 249 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. 1952).
1962]
KENTucKY LAW Jot RNAL Vl5
applicable if the defendant in the exercise of ordinary care should have
seen plaintiff's peril.6 In accordance with this theory, the court has
justified submission of the doctrine to the jury where the defendant's
testimony, as to when he did see plaintiff's peril, would establish
that he did not have a last clear chance. 7
In Saddler v. Parham,s the court, in criticizing the doctrines of
contributory negligence and last clear chance, stated by way of dic-
tum that the should have seen rule only applies when the plaintiff
is physically unable to escape from his peril. Subsequent opinions
have made no attempt to apply this standard in automobile cases, but
instead have held that the should have seen rule is applicable in such
cases. The opinions have not made a valid attempt to distinguish
between cases where the plaintiff was physically unable to escape.9
Any question relating to the proper application of the doctrine would
appear to have been resolved in Ross v. Vasseur:
The last clear chance rule, as it prevails in this jurisdiction in motor
vehicle cases, applies where a negligent party's peril is not only ac-
tually discovered but also where it is reasonably obvious and should
have been discovered by an approaching motorist in the exercise
of ordinary care and diligence, as by observing a proper lookout duty.
(Emphasis added.) 1o
The court in the principal case did not deem it necessary to
enumerate any of the factual testimony on which it rejected the last
clear chance instruction. If the rule is should have seen, as it appears
to be, the record is replete with testimony sufficient to justify the
instruction. Plaintiff testified that the defendant's automobile was
one-half to three-fourths of a block away when the turn was started,"
The driver of plaintiff's car testified that defendant's automobile was
200-250 feet away when the turn was started.1 2 A bystander testified
that the defendant was from 150-200 feet away when the turn was
started,13 and further that the defendant did not slow down, change
directions or blow his horn.14 The driver of defendant's automobile
6 Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Tungent's Adm'r, 313 Ky. 1, 229
S.W.2d 985 (1950); Ramsey v. Sharpley, 294 Ky. 286, 171 S.W.2d 427 (1943).
See Swift & Co. v. Thompson's Adm'r, 308 Ky. 529, 214 S.W.2d 758 (1948),
for a resume of unconscious last clear chance cases.
7Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Tungent's Adm'r, 313 Ky. 1, 229
S.W.2d 985 (1950); Cumberland Grocery Co. v. Hewlett, 231 Ky. 702, 22
S.W.2d 97 (1929).
8 249 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. 1952).
9 Johnson v. Morris Adm'x, 282 S.W.2d 835 (Ky. 1955).
10 320 S.W.2d 608, 611 (Ky. 1959): The court referred to Saddler v. Par-
ham, 249 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. 1952), but apparently accorded it very little sig-
nificance.
1 Record, p. 4, q. 13, Rankin v. Green, 346 S.W.2d 477 (Ky. 1961).
12Id. at 125, q. 2.
131d. at 57, q. 20-22.
14 Id. at 58, q. 25-27.
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testified that he saw plaintiff's car when he was 80-90 feet away, 5
and that he saw the car start to turn when he was within 10-15
feet of the intersection. 6
The extreme variance in the testimony of plaintiff and defendant
is the reason for giving the trier of fact discretion in weighing the
testimony. In such a case as this, does the court invade the province
of the jury in refusing the instruction? The court would be correct
in denying the instruction if it relied only upon the testimony of the
defendant that he was within 10-15 feet of the intersection when the
turn was started. However, is it within the court's discretion to
disregard the plaintiff's collaborative testimony? This demonstrates
the necessity for the should have seen rule. If the did see rule is
applicable defendant's testimony would constitute an absolute de-
fense to the last clear chance doctrine. This premise arises out of the
difficulty of proving what the defendant in fact did see, his testimony
notwithstanding. The court in the principal case either weighed
the testimony of the parties and decided in favor of the defendant,
or it applied the did see rule. If the latter was the basis for the deci-
sion, which is the only justifiable basis, the court should have enun-
ciated the rule to be followed in subsequent cases instead of leaving
the question open to speculation.
Left Turn Doctrine
Turning left at an intersection when an automobile is approaching
from the opposite direction often necessitates a decision as to whether
the turn can be made safely. If a finding of contributory negligence
is to be avoided for an ensuing collision with the oncoming auto-
mobile it would appear that the decision should be based on a reason-
able judgment. Prior actions in Kentucky have been decided on this
credible premise; however, in the principal case the court justified
its holding by making the unqualified and unexplained statement
that, "priority shall be given to the vehicle proceeding in a straight
course."17
The court should take judicial notice that making a left turn is as
inherently necessary to driving as proceeding in a straight course.
Left turns must be made and the primary responsibility for making
them safely is upon the turning driver; however, should it be an
absolute responsibility? Must the turning driver assume that the
oncoming driver sees nothing? Judgment is not infallible; a driver
should be able to rely upon the other's attention to the road when
15 Id. at 81, q. 80.
16 Id. at 82, . .
t7 Rankin v. Green, 346 S.W.2d 477, 478 (Ky. 1961).
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he makes a turn and if necessary that he will take slight avoiding
action. The implication from the brief opinion in the principal case
is that the driver proceeding in a straight course is not liable even
if he fails to look, since he can expect the right-of-way. This is the
only logical conclusion that can be drawn from the court's findings
(when discussing the last clear chance instruction) of ample proof of
defendant's antecedent negligence.'8
The Kentucky legislature has expressed its intention: "no person
shall turn a vehicle ... unless and until such movement can be made
with reasonable safety."19 The legislature has further suggested what
it considers as reasonable safety: "The operator of any vehicle when
upon a highway shall travel upon the right side of the highway
whenever possible, and unless the left side of the highway is clear of
all other traffic or obstructions and presents a clear vision for a dis-
tance of at least one hundred and fifty feet ahead."20 These statutory
dictates sholud not be construed to give absolute priority to the
vehicle proceeding in a straight course.
The court overruled Walton v. Grant2l and Elliott v. Drury's
Adm'x.22 In both of these cases the court emphasized the statutory
requirement that a turn be made with reasonable safety23 and held
that if the person making the turn reached and entered the intersection
reasonably well ahead of the oncoming car, the latter must yield
the right-of-way. These holdings offered a practical solution to the
problem. If the decision to make the turn is based upon a reasonable
judgment the driver will not be contributorily negligent; however, if
the oncoming driver fails to keep a look-out and thus, to yield the
right-of-way if necessary, he will be held liable, at least where only
slight avoiding action, such as slowing, would permit the left turn
to be completed safely.
Authority for overruling these cases was stated to be Louisville
Transit Co. v. Gipe24 and Smith v. Sizemore.25 There is nothing in
either opinion to suggest that the vehicle proceeding in a straight
18 Id. at 478.
19 Ky. Rev. Stat. §189.880(1) (Emphasis added.) [hereinafter cited as KRS]2
0KRS 189.800(1).
21802 Ky. 194, 194 S.W.2d 866 (1946).
22804 Ky. 93, 200 S.W.2d 141 (1947).
23 KRS 189.880(1).
24277 S.W.2d 52 (Ky. 1955): Plaintiff started a left turn across an inter-
section because he thought the bus was going to stop. The court held as a matter
of law that plaintiff's negligence was the cause of the accident and directed a
verdict for the defendant.
25 300 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Ky. 1957): "[Ijt is clear that he failed in the
reasonable safety' duty .... It has been clearly and conclusively shown that the
injuries suffered by reason of the collision were the direct result of the sole negli-
gence of Sizemore.
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course had absolute priority. The cases were both decided on their
facts, the court finding that the plaintiffs had in fact not made the
turns with reasonable safety, which is the statutory requirement.
The opinion rendered in the principal case was contrary to the
legislative intent and overruled established case law. It contributes
to a mechanical jurisprudence in an area of conduct singularly in
need of more fi6xible treatment. There is a compelling need for a
more ample explanation for the result reached than was provided in
this case.
Lowell T. Hughes
ToRTs-Ca uwABLE Im uNrr-Decedent died from injuries allegedly
received in a fall from a hospital bed while he was a patient in de-
fendant's hospital. His administratrix charged that the injuries re-
sulted from the negligence of the hospital and its agents. The de-
fendant answered that it operated a non-profit, non-stock corpora-
tion, for purely charitable purposes, and was not liable for negligence
under the doctrine of charitable immunity. Plaintiffs motion to strike
was overruled and the complaint dismissed. Held: Reversed. Despite
its previous contrary position, the court reasoned that charitable
immunity was based upon expediency rather than right, and, stand-
ing alone, it was not a sufficient defense. Mullikin v. Jewish Hosp.
As'n, 348 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. 1961).
The Mullikin decision placed Kentucky among a number of
jurisdictions which have recently denied charitable immunity.1 The
Kentucky court overruled a precedent which was established in 1894,
when a purely charitable institution was held immune from an ac-
tion for assault upon an inmate by an institution employee.2 Al-
though the Kentucky court continued to uphold charitable immunity
'Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hosp., 78 Idaho 60. 297 P.2d
1041 (1956); Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 105 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1960); Collopy
v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958); Bing v. Thunig,
2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957); Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St.
467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956)- Kojis v. Doctors Hosp., 12 Wis.2d 367, 107 N.W.2d
131 (1961). See Rodkey, Charitable Immunity-A Tale of a Law in Flux, 48 Ill.,
B.J. 644 (1960), listing twenty-one jurisdictions with no immunity and twenty
jurisdictions with quaed immunity in 1960, and the Hosp. L. Manual, Neg-
ligence II, charts A, A 1 & A 2 (Atty's vol. 1961), listing only seven states with
total immunity. A now out-dated survey is found in Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29,
143-200 (1952). Contra, Tomlinson v. Trustees of Univ. of Pa., 164 F. Supp.
352 (E.D. Pa. 1958); Muller v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 160 Neb. 279, 70
N.W.2d 86 (1955); Memorial Hosp. Inc. v. Oakes, Admx, 200 Va. 878, 108
S.E.2d 388 (1959). See Joachim, Questionable Status of Charitable Immunity,
32 Conn. B.J. 830, 831 (1958) listing fifteen reasons given for the charitable
immunity doctrine.2 Williams v. Ind. School of Reform, 93 Ky. 251, 24 S.W. 1065 (1894).
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